Founding Principles, Secular Skeptics, and Religious Freedom -- Review of Kathleen A. Brady, The Distinctiveness of Religion in American Law: Rethinking Religion Clause Jurisprudence (2015) by John Witte, Jr.
255 RHR 
Draft 
Published in Journal of Law and Religion 32 (2018): 515-18 
 
 
Founding Principles, Secular Skeptics, and Religious Freedom:  
Review of Kathleen A. Brady, The Distinctiveness of Religion in American Law: 
Rethinking Religion Clause Jurisprudence 
 





This review essay evaluates Kathleen Brady’s provocative and original defense 
of the idea that religion remains special in modern liberal democracies, and deserves 
special constitutional treatment.  While warmly commending this work, this essay also 
queries the author’s non-originalist reading of original sources, her non-theological 
account of religious arguments, and her neglect of valuable international human rights 
sources in support of religious freedom for all.  
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American religious freedom is under attack today in political, popular, and 
academic realms alike.  The academic attack is the main focus of this important new 
book by our distinguished colleague, Kathleen Brady.  A number of smart legal 
scholars, she shows, have challenged the idea that religion is special or deserving of 
special constitutional or legislative protection.  Even if this idea existed in the 
eighteenth-century founding era – and that is now sharply contested, too – it has 
become obsolete in our post-establishment, post-modern, and post-religious age, these 
critics argue.  Religion is just too dangerous, divisive, and diverse in its demands to be 
accorded special protection. Freedom of conscience claimants unfairly demand the right 
to be a law unto themselves, to the detriment of general laws and to the endangerment 
of other people’s fundamental rights and legitimate interests.  Institutional religious 
autonomy is too often just a special cover for abuses of power and forms of prejudice 
that should not be countenanced in any organization – religious or not.  Religious liberty 
claims are too often proxies for political or social agendas that deserve no more 
protection than any other.  Religion, these critics thus conclude, should be viewed as 
just another category of liberty or association, with no more preference or privilege than 
its secular counterparts.  Religion should be treated as just another form of belief and 
expression that must play by the rules of rational democratic deliberation just like 
everyone else.  To accord religion any special protection or exemption is plain 
discrimination against the non-religious.  To afford religion a seat at the table of public 
deliberation or a role in the implementation of government programs is a recipe for 
religious self-dealing contrary to the establishment clause.  We cannot afford these 
traditional constitutional luxuries any longer.  
Enter Kathleen Brady with her learned, lithe, and lively engagement with the 
foundations and fundamentals of American religious freedom.  In tightly written and 
exquisitely documented prose, she makes the case for the distinct nature of religion and 
for the special protection of religious freedom.  She documents neatly the rise of 
neutrality/equality jurisprudence in the last generation of Supreme Court case law and 
its wide appeal to courts and commentators alike.  She notes that, nonetheless, both 
Congress and the Supreme Court have recently given or allowed special protections to 
religious freedom in some instances.  But she worries that this might well represent the 
last gasp of an old regime that will eventually die out in our post-modern age if a strong 
case for special treatment of religion cannot be made out in universally accessible and 
acceptable terms. 
In impressive fashion, Brady rehearses the various arguments proffered by 
modern courts and commentators in favor of religious freedom, and in particular in 
favoring religion over non-religion.  First, because of the nature of religious belief: 
Religious beliefs are deeply and intensely held, have compelling force, and will cause 
special psychic harm if they are violated at the expense of human dignity. Religious 
beliefs are integral to personal life, self-identity, definition, and direction. Religion is 
uniquely based on faith, not reason, while law is based on reason, not faith. Religious 
beliefs are ultimate, while secular beliefs are less weighty. Second, because of the 
essential interactions between religion, law, and the state: Religion is a buffer that 
protects individuals for state power. Religion cultivates values and virtues that are 
essential to democracy. Religion is an especially, if not uniquely valuable, human 
activity that provides individuals, society, and the state with a range of goods. Religion 
and state operate in different spheres and worlds that cannot invade the other, and 
government is incompetent to interfere in or judge religious matters. Third, because of 
the importance of religious freedom in the protection of other liberties: Religious 
freedom is a special aspect of personal liberty. Religious freedom, in the form of 
separation of religion and state, ensures no battles among religion for government 
approval or benefits, and no bending of state power to do the will of religion. Religious 
freedom is a prophylactic against civic harm since religious believers will disobey the 
law if it is contrary to religious commands. Religious freedom deserves special 
protection because the American founders and the First Amendment text say so, by 
uniquely foreclosing government benefits for religion under the establishment clause 
and uniquely protecting religious beliefs and believers under the free exercise clause. 
Brady ultimately finds each of these arguments wanting, because they have 
secular equivalents or because they are too self-serving, sectarian, or antiquarian to 
convince the modern secularist or skeptic.  Religious freedom and its special protection 
by and from government, she says, requires a more universally accessible and 
convincing argument. Brady thinks that this more universal argument can be found in 
the insights of the eighteenth-century American founders.  She appeals to them not as 
an originalist, but because she thinks the founders offered enduring teachings about 
religion that can still appeal to the religious and secular alike in our post-modern day.  In 
Brady’s formulation, James Madison and the founders treated religion as a unique 
human relationship with a transcendent or ultimate source and end of reality that 
provides answers to the ultimate questions of being, telos, suffering, finitude, and death.  
Religion entails and demands unique forms of reverence, obedience, and surrender.  
Religion provides an avenue to fulfillment and liberation beyond anything available on 
earth.  And religion is ultimately latent in every human being, even if only fully realized 
or formally exercised by some.  The founders adumbrated these arguments, Brady 
states, and these have been elaborated by many religious and philosophical traditions 
to this day.  Even the bitterest skeptic and strongest anti-religious nihilist can see the 
power of these arguments, she thinks, and the uniqueness of religion and the necessity 
of religious freedom as a consequence.   
From these insights about religion, Brady argues, the founders developed 
“principles” and “values” of religious freedom that they built into the new constitutional 
laws of their day.  There is a notable shift in analysis here, as Brady moves from a 
highly abstracted version of the founders’ teachings on religion to a close molecule-by-
molecule analysis of their teachings on religious freedom principles and their 
manifestation in the new constitutional laws of religious freedom.  She reduces the 
founding religious freedom principles to four: (1) liberty of conscience, (2) equality and 
plurality of faiths, (3) separation of church and state, but some (4) cooperation of 
government and religion.  These principles form the bedrock of American religious 
freedom jurisprudence still today, she says – and one might add, they have strong 
analogues in the European Court of Human Rights of late, as well as in international 
human rights instruments beginning with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Articles 18 and 26. 
Having laid out this argument for the uniqueness of religion, and for the special 
principles devised by the founders for its protection, Brady then works out her theory of 
religious accommodation and free exercise exemptions for religion.  As the First 
Congress already saw, the principle of liberty of conscience requires judicially 
enforceable rights to exemption for religious claimants, both individuals and groups, 
who are substantially burdened in the exercise of their religion.  Brady thinks these 
claims need be anchored in the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution, not just in 
statutes, and that claimants need to meet both traditional tests of sincerity and more 
recent tests of substantiality of burden on their religion to press their case.  She offers a 
fine-tuned analysis of the Supreme Court decisions, including such recent cases as 
Hosanna-Tabor, Holt, Reed, and Hobby Lobby to vindicate her position. 
This is a big and bold argument, judiciously and generously phrased, fair-minded 
and foresightful, wide ranging in its use of sources, and pulsing with good will.  Brady 
takes strong positions, and is not afraid to criticize others, but does so with exemplary 
scholarly restraint and craft.  In a field riven with high emotions and sharp rhetoric of 
late, a sober, careful, and cogent book like this is especially welcome. There are three 
further comments I would make about her analysis – one historical, one philosophical, 
and one comparative.  
First, there is a delicate dance in this non-originalist resort to the original sources 
of the founders.  This move is not unlike the moves made by neo-Thomists who plunder 
the Summa Theologica or neo-Calvinists who plunder the Institutes for modern-day 
arguments – or what federal judge and legal scholar John Noonan does with James 
Madison’s “insights” in his memorable The Lustre of our Country.  Rather like Noonan, 
for whom she clerked, Brady turns to Madison especially among other founders to find 
arguments about why religion is distinctive and deserving of special treatment.   
This move will likely generate a number of questions for readers. Is this a faithful 
representation of the founders’ views on religion, and of religious freedom?  Why the 
pronounced shift in the mode of reading them when moving from their definition of 
religion to their delineation of religious liberty principles?  Shouldn’t there be better 
reason for turning to the founders’ generation than that they provided clever and 
interesting arguments that might still be convincing today? And what of the 200 years 
plus of constitutional tradition thereafter? Are the four founding principles of religious 
freedom that Brady adduces comprehensive? Will the skeptics of originalism be any 
more convinced by this non-originalist rendering of original sources? What does one 
say to the critic who dismisses Madison, Jefferson, and other founders as a bunch of 
white, elite, self-interested males, trading on Western Christian premises that no longer 
obtain, or to the nihilist or atheist who says that matters of ultimate concern and 
reverence are just our imaginations and fears run wild?  
This leads to a second point.  Do advocates for religious freedom like Brady cede 
too much of the methodological, let alone confessional, turf by distinguishing so easily 
between religious and nonreligious (sectarian and secular) arguments, and insisting that 
the argument for special religious freedom protection must convince the skeptic, 
agnostic, and anti-religious or at least be different from anything they can argue as well?  
Brady is not convinced by the textual argument which says that while the nonreligious 
gets ample constitutional protections elsewhere in the First Amendment, the religious 
gets special protections and disabilities under the Free Exercise Clause.  But couldn’t 
the argument be turned around, especially given the generous definitions of religion 
under free exercise and statutory jurisprudence?  Couldn’t one say to the so-called 
“secularist’ opponents of special religious freedom that a good number of their views 
have religious qualities as well?  
To be sure, this argument can prove too much.  If every philosophical argument 
is ultimately or fundamentally religious, even self-described nonreligious or secular 
arguments, then ultimately there’s nothing special about religion, and no special 
protection that the traditionally religious can claim.  And, indeed, if Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence returns to a stricter scrutiny regime than what’s available under the Free 
Speech Clause, perhaps more self-professed secularists and atheists might start 
making free exercise arguments, too, perhaps undercutting the special qualities of free 
exercise protection.  I don’t have an easy answer to this worry.  But I do worry about 
having to defend religious freedom in a way that the bitterest skeptic and most cynical 
non-religionist will be convinced – knowing that they have already made a faith-like leap 
against religion that no rational argument can rebut. 
Third, one important argument for the special protection for religious freedom 
missing from Brady’s analysis is that protection of religion and religious freedom has 
proved critical to the protection of many other human rights.1  Even in post-modern 
liberal societies, religions help to define the meanings and measures of shame and 
regret, restraint and respect, responsibility and restitution that a human rights regime 
presupposes.  They help to lay out the fundamentals of human dignity and human 
community, and the essentials of human nature and human needs upon which human 
rights are built.  Moreover, religions stand alongside the state and other institutions in 
helping to implement and protect the rights of a person and community— especially at 
times when the state becomes weak, distracted, divided, or cash-strapped.  Religious 
communities can create the conditions and sometimes prototypes for the realization of 
civil and political rights of speech, press, assembly, and more.  They can provide a 
critical sometimes the principal means of education, health care, child care, labor 
organizations, employment, and artistic opportunities, among other things.  And they 
can offer some of the deepest insights into duties of stewardship and service that lie at 
the heart of environmental care.  
Because of the vital role of religion in the cultivation and implementation of 
human rights, many social scientists and human rights scholars have come to see that 
providing strong protections for religious beliefs, practices, and institutions enhances, 
rather than diminishes, human rights for all.  Many scholars now repeat the American 
founders’ insight that religious freedom is “the first freedom” from which other rights and 
freedoms evolve.  For the religious individual, the right to believe often correlates with 
freedoms to assemble, speak, worship, evangelize, educate, parent, travel, or to abstain 
from the same on the basis of one’s beliefs.  For the religious association, the right to 
practice religion collectively implicates rights to corporate property, collective worship, 
organized charity, religious education, freedom of press, and autonomy of governance.  
Those who argue that American religious freedom is a dispensable and dangerous 
cultural luxury might well be playing right into the hands of those who would wish to 
subvert human rights and freedoms altogether. 
 
 
1 Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke, The Price of Religious Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and 
Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (2011); John Witte, Jr., and M. Christian Green, Religion and Human 
Rights: An Introduction (2012). 
